times as sheerly dogmatic.
To repeat, it is acknowledging this drive to assertion that constitutes the substance of what Cavell calls confession in Wittgenstein. If this element of confession and acknowledgement is to become the theme of some sort of autobiography, it will be within the aegis of a transformed sense of autobiographical writing.
Attending to the unity, or rather to the community, of the "We" in a philosophical claim, and of how the "I" becomes merged in the "We", has led to a certain amount of neglect of the question of how the reader of such modes of writing gets addressed. For Cavell is often very clear that there is no guarantee that the goal of unity will be achieved: it is just as likely, perhaps more likely, that the claim to philosophical unity will be rejected or indeed disavowed. Beyond the various awkward efforts to deal with the sheer facts of human difference, there are aspects of philosophical writing which are downright distasteful. Even when our writing successfully invites a reader's participation, such writing also implicates the reader. A reader may feel forced to deny this implication (perhaps as a way of avoiding it) and to decline the accompanying invitation. And as in actual social life when we invite someone to join us and they decline, we may well become embarrassed. And the embarrassment goes along with and perhaps in large part is constituted by self-consciousness.
The "I" encumbered by self-consciousness is a topic of Cavell's that radiates out to modernist art and reaches back to Emerson and Descartes. Attention to the autobiographical may seem like a peculiar way to overcome self-consciousness. But it is of the essence of Cavell's work that acknowledging a condition is not intended to overcome it so much as it is supposed to show us how to live with it, that is how we follow its unfolding and its sense of inevitable progress and discovery. Autobiographical attention does not defeat the more pernicious effects of self-consciousness -e.g., its paralysis. It shows us a way of outlasting these effects and using to the fullest the life within the details of a life.
II. Autobiography, Acknowledgment and Method
It is evidently hard for many readers to absorb the centrality of Cavell's method. And this turns out to mean it is hard for them to acknowledge the pivotal philosophical and human role of acknowledgement, as Cavell actually depicts it. This difficulty will come to stand in the way of understanding at least one major aspect of the philosophical role of autobiography in Cavell's work. To put it crudely -but not more crudely than I have heard it put -Cavell does not first set out to achieve a philosophically observant and self-reflective individuality only to then express that individuality. The expressions of his autobiography are not exhibitions of his inner performance as a philosophical sensibility. They would be better seen as experiments in one of the oldest problems that Cavell sets for himself as a philosopher and as a writer: the relation of an "I" which claims to speak for us -and to us -and the "We" who find or fail to find that we are spoken for.
I want to underscore the significance of method by examining, primarily, the opening pages of "Knowing and Acknowledging." These passages, which extend their influence throughout this essay and into his latest work, are surely among the most detailed and comprehensive accounts of method that he provides. It is here that Cav-ell first takes his most explicit steps past the more canonical accomplishments of Austin's teaching. The essay arrives climactically at the theme of the "I" and the "you", as befits an essay on the relation of my mind to other minds, of me to you. But the essay begins with an extensive investigation of how I come to speak for us, and of how I come to accommodate the one I cannot speak for. "The one I cannot speak for" is not named explicitly in this essay. But nonetheless it is a way of characterizing the skep- Before these specific risks emerge, we must understand what develops when the risks Cavell runs are more immediately revealing and remunerative. What emerges throughout Must We Mean What We Say? and especially in the chapter "Knowing and Acknowledging" 7 is that skepticism enacts a crisis in the very methods that are meant to respond to it. And that crisis overtakes the "I" which speaks and performs the methods of ordinary language philosophy, and it turns out to be a crisis in the "I" which the methods are aimed at recovering. I begin with a sketch of the methodological progression:
1) The "I" of the philosopher of the ordinary appeals to what we say in order to reach out to a community of "We", a community that expresses itself as we.
2) The "I" is overtaken by a crisis of method within the "We," a crisis which inserts the turbulent "I" back to what Cavell at least once calls "home," a place where the "I" and its utterances are not fated to distress each other. 8
3) The "I" learns to acknowledge the other speakers, the object of the desired knowledge.
4) The "I" returns to itself enriched by experience and method, and capable of a "We" which is no longer to be presumed necessary but may now emerge as genuinely possible.
The crisis is first made more acute and then resolved with an increase of philosophical perspective and (potentially) human responsiveness. There is in fact a Must We?, 43. state of mind which is preliminary to these steps. Cavell is quite explicit about this state, but it has not generally received much attention. Without this step, or without achieving something like this perspective, the procedure will go astray from the beginning. Cavell makes explicit that the appeal to what we ordinarily say requires not merely some direct linguistic response to a given situation but a reliance on yourself as possessor of language, or in short, as a speaker. But there is a catch to this reliance, to what we might think of as a first sketch of the method or work of self-reliance.
Cavell puts it like this:
The way you must rely upon yourself as a source of what is said, demands that you grant full title to others as sources of that data -not out of politeness but because the nature of the claim that you make for yourself is repudiated without that acknowledgment. 9 In another words, in order to so much as to engage in "the appeal to what we say" we must have already learned to grant the rights of other speakers to the same appeal. To be a speaker with the right to such appeals -that is, to have the power of speechyou must be able to grant the separate existence of the others within the "We" you are appealing to. It is I assume no accident -though it is also not self-explanatory -that Cavell's first use of the word "acknowledgement" in this essay is precisely part of his characterization of this method of appealing to "what we say." More exactly, "acknowledgement" occurs in a characterization of how a particular speaker becomes able to use this method appropriately. What ends with acknowledgement as a category for the assessment of human responsiveness begins with a philosopher's effort to understand himself as responding to one's own utterances and to those others' responses to a situation. Again there is the balance of my responses between self and other, and there is therefore the possibility of an imbalance, or words running out of control. 10 Whatever the starting point, and whatever the outcome, it has become evident that the self -the "I" -must undergo some changes before it is ready for the changes that are brought about by the methods of ordinary language.
The method of appealing to what we say thus sets preconditions in the state of the "I" who performs this appeal. Most explicitly, Cavell invites us to repudiate the stance of expertise when we reflect on the data we have obtained. When I discover and
give voice to what "We" say, I have obtained acknowledge through a certain kind of privileged access. But it is crucial to the appeals that this knowledge is not the privilege of an expert, singled out by that knowledge from other speakers and knowers.
Like citizenship, with which Cavell will find systematic analogies, 11 it is a privilege open to all who claim it. The expert and the skeptic both enter the issue of the ordinary by way of knowledge and of language. Expertise naturally expresses itself in forms of words that are oddly placed in relation to ordinary speech, often as a kind of jargon. The skeptic claims that he is a kind of negative expert, an expert in the negative, and so the secondary claim is that the skeptic's words have an equal right to be technical, eccentric or merely odd-sounding.
Part of what is unique to Cavell's diagnosis is that he makes explicit that the putative expert and the would-be skeptic meet at a certain eccentric stance towards language. The skeptic assumes the right to use words that are forced, out of the ordinary, beyond the familiar sounds of ordinary speech. But Cavell denies the philoso- speech. We are constituted by this crisis. The "I" we start from must be willing to grant rights to other speakers, which in this case means that it must be willing to dissipate itself in an obstinate resistance to anything like a "we."
This move by Cavell is underscored in his discussion of the skeptic's concessions -concessions about the 'forcedness' of his remarks: "I know (that a coffee cup is on the counter, or that the tomato is not made of plastic). But I know it "for all practical purposes." These concessions, Cavell says "may themselves seem forced, or seem empty; but to show this you would have to show that a master of English, who knows everything that you know, has no real use for them." 12 We note again that the sharing out of knowledge (which includes the knowledge of our stance towards the world) is precisely correlated to our understanding that an utterance has a use in the world -a serious use we might say. Cavell here begins an intellectual trajectory away from language as a mere symbolic expression of statements to something more like what Austin means by an illocutionary act. A concession of oddness is not merely an intellectual act of conceding, which happens to sound odd or empty. The concession can now be seen as beyond an act of oddness: it is an empty gesture, and act of emptiness. It is not a declaration that our efforts to know the world will come to nothing. The skeptic glimpses that we have already emptied our words, in order not to know that the gesture of our words does nothing, and was already emptied out when we began to make it.
Cavell continues:
An essential step in showing [that these utterances have no serious use] would be to convince the skeptic -that is, the skeptic in yourself -that you know what he takes his words to say. (Not exactly what he takes them to mean, as though they had for him some special or technical meaning.) […] [I]n the philosophy which proceeds from ordinary language understanding from inside is methodologically fundamental. 13 Again, I must understand -the "I" in me must understand -that the oddness or emptiness of the words does not come from some kind of technicality or other spe- to be to be careful not to spill it.
With regard to skepticism about other minds, we feel the need to record a contrast (as Cavell comes to put it) between my position in relation to your pain and yours. However unsatisfying it may be to note this difference between us as differences in our positions, it remains an obvious way to record what feels like a certain kind of fact: "I can only know your pain from your words and behavior -i.e., indirectly -but I know my pain directly." Now we are in a position to say that Cavell depicts the skeptic's world of other humans as inflected away from us. But he also depicts those others, those who are "apparently present" to us as actually hidden behind or within their bodies. In such cases, we have the sense that a more direct path exists or could exist. In the case of other feelings, this often comes to the sense that if only you did not have to express your feelings then the path to my understanding of you would be straighter, or more direct.
It is not difficult -though among academic philosophers it is also not very common -to explore the kind of life we might live in the midst of such indirection and supposition about others. It is for the most part, Cavell declares explicitly, the life we are actually living. It is what he calls "living our skepticism." 15 Despite what some have written, this phase does not describe a life that accepts "finitude" and the fact that there are boundaries to what we can know of others. That is, the phrase is taken to refer to a conscious acceptance of the limits of our awareness and of the fact that our finite experience is a source of inescapable hindrances to our lives with others.
In the phrase "living our skepticism," Cavell is rather trying to characterize a kind of life that avoids having to discover what our human boundaries come to. It is easier to think of ourselves as accepting something indefinitely finite about our relations to other than to have to face how utterly definite our limitations towards others turn out to be in a given case.
Cavell sums this up in the idea that criteria are disappointing, and here this means that we are for the most part disappointed by our relations with people. 16 What is to be accepted, if ultimately transformed, is first of all this disappointment. I am not speaking primarily about a disappointment in the quality or intensity of those relationships but rather a disappointment with what we might call their directness. I am not saying that these issues are easy to keep separate. But at least initially, to understand the fourth part of The Claim of Reason, we must be able to focus on the dependency of our relatedness on others on their expressiveness (by way of criteria) and our acceptance of those expressions. We must learn to recognize our disappointment in criteria. 17 In Cavell's account, we do not move directly to some wholesale acceptance of our "finitude", presumably in some wholesale opposition to "infinitude." A major problem with that sense of how we are to accept finitude is that it tends to make the rejection of transcendence itself too absolute. It neglects the fact that our longings for the incorrigible, the perfected and the immortal must be dealt in domestic and daily contexts, or else our rejection of "infinitude" will partially share the longing that it is trying to reject. And when these longings are disappointed, it is not just our criteria but the world itself which will seem to be insufficient and its existence unjustified.
There are at least two perspectives on skepticism by which we can track our withdrawal from the world and the world's withdrawal from us: there is a skepticism whose disappointment is a modification of a more fundamental drive to destructiveness. And there is a skepticism which is a kind of medium of indifference: if you cannot tell the difference between the existence or non-existence (the presence or absence) of a coffee cup or an envelope or a migraine, then there is a sense in which, at least epistemologically you do not at bottom care if the object exists. And while that is
not immediately a wish to deny the existence of the object in question, it is certainly compatible with such a wish.
IV. Autobiography and the Trauma of Knowing
Near the beginning of Little Did I Know, Cavell brings together the destructive consequences of the denial of knowledge (a kind of prototype of skepticism) and the eventually destructive consequences of the deferral or dispersal of knowledge. This is a further step in the problematic of knowledge and doubt. It suggests that the step outside the circle of philosophical belief and denial -for instance a step into literature or autobiography -will be as dangerous as the effort to confine your issues to the realm of the academic if I had wished to construct an autobiography in which to disperse the bulk of the terrible things I know about myself, and the shameful things I have seen in others, I would have tried writing novels in which to disguise them. 18 If this passage implicitly relates philosophy to autobiography, at the same time it also overtly dissociates the form of philosophical autobiography that he intends to be writing from certain kinds of novels. The issue is not about narratives of fact versus narrative of fiction: either form of narrative is capable of hiding the truth by dispersing it. Moreover, Cavell is only rarely inclined to praise the truth of art and literature by praising the products of their imaginative freedom over the unyielding abstractions of philosophy. For Cavell the imagination is just much an agent of self-deception as a vehicle for self-knowledge. Autobiography becomes philosophical at least in part as a counter movement to human evasiveness. That is, autobiography is not just the story of someone's life but a kind of written concentration of that life.
In Little Did I Know, Cavell's ability to concentrate the details of a scene of his life emerges from a kind of writing and allows for a kind of self-knowledge. It is a mode of knowing that he calls "undispersed" as if the enemy of self-knowledge was
not merely self-deception or self-evasion, but a kind of self-dissipation. If I am sufficiently disconnected from anything like the center of myself or spread out across the surfaces of my world, then my efforts at self-consciousness will not have enough connection with each other even to begin the work of self-knowledge. One of the principal tasks of Little Did I Know is therefore to dramatize the interplay between selfknowledge and the disguises of the self. If a primary goal is to achieve an undispersed knowledge, the reader must acknowledge both his identifications with the writer's story and his varying distances from that story.
The reader may imitate the author in his self-recovery but this is an outcome that cannot be readily predicted. The writer's life will strike us as singular, but it must be understood in its representative ordinariness. At the same time, we must grasp this life as the site within which the legacy of knowledge is also to be grasped. The ordinary conditions of such knowledge are discovered in its very limitations.
In an early scene in Little Did I Know, a traumatic limit of knowledge and the wish to know is revealed at a moment when the boy's power of knowledge is directly attacked by his father. At the beginning of the passage Cavell writes this, with regard to the "date of revelation of paternal hatred": Some wish to delay it is understandable; to postpone it indefinitely has, I can see become dangerous, its silence blocking something irreplaceably valuable.
But why does it always fall to me to be the one asked to understand? It took me a long time to get to that question, one that I would hate to have bequeathed uncontested to the young that I care for. 19 The scene is the one where the boy has been transported to a new and strange neighborhood in Atlanta, and he discovers, within a decorative glass container, a kind of candy (which Cavell refers to as "wafers" 20 ). He says, "I didn't know we had these here". His father moves towards him from the "semi dark" at the other end of the sofa Little, 16. 20 . William Day reminds us that the standard name for such candies is "non-pareils." He obtained Cavell's agreement that this was a deliberate choice on Cavell's part. There is no room here to join Day's suggestions about the "wafer" invoking the sacrament, and Cavell invoking his Romantic sense of reading as redemptive has requiring its own sense of sacramental, of mingling the inner and outer "substances" of what is to be understood. See, Day, Andrew Taylor and James Loxley, Stanley Cavell: Philosophy, Literature and Criticism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012). and, grabbing the candy and the lid from the boy, says "And you still don't know it." 21 The rage of this denial is far from any skeptical thought. His goal is not to create doubt in the boy's mind. Cavell is certainly willing to suggest connections between the moods of skepticism and the frame of mind that would deny the possibility of knowledge and of a basic form of human relation to the world. But that is not the same as a scene of the origin of doubt and the struggle against doubt.
Since Cavell delayed releasing this story and its knowledge for so long, we can read him as in a sense preparing us for its release. We should not skip over any steps in our reception of this traumatic moment. Cavell's knowledge (itself uttered quite casually -he says "aimlessly") is attacked in such a way as to make clear his father's wish to obliterate the very idea that his son might have known of or the presence of this candy, this from of pleasure. 22 This is a frame of mind sufficiently destructive of human relations to the world or to other people that it would render skepticism superfluous. This mood eradicates the one who would know, and hence eradicates any 
